> On Dec 18, 2019, at 1:28 AM, Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged > processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace > monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but > CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged > with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@xxxxxx> > --- > kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > index 44bd08f2443b..bafe21ac6d92 100644 > --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) > u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; > int ret; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EPERM; > if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) > return -EINVAL; I guess we need to fix this check for kprobe/uprobe created with perf_event_open()... Thanks, Song _______________________________________________ Intel-gfx mailing list Intel-gfx@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
