On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 5:45 AM Sara Dickinson <sara@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 29 Nov 2019, at 15:39, Stephen Farrell via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Reviewer: Stephen Farrell
> Review result: Ready
Hi Stephen,
Thanks for reviewing (again)!
>
> I might not be the best reviewer for this one as I've read it a few times
> before. But anyway, I scanned the diff [1] with RFC7626 and figure it
> seems fine.
>
> The only thing that occurred to me that seemed missing was to note
> that while the new privacy analysis in 3.5.1.1 is already complex, many
> systems are mobile and hence an analysis that ignores that won't be
> sufficient. For a mobile device one really needs to analyse all of the
> possible setups, and hence it's even harder to get to a good answer.
> (It could be that that's elsewhere in the document but since I only
> read the diff, I didn't see it:-)
There was a bit of discussion about this and the following text in 3.4.1 was added:
“ It is also noted that typically a device connected _only_ to a modern
cellular network is
o directly configured with only the recursive resolvers of the IAP
and
o all traffic (including DNS) between the device and the cellular
network is encrypted following an encryption profile edited by the
Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP [2]).
The attack surface for this specific scenario is not considered here."
This seems insufficient. We don't generally assume that the encryption in
mobile access networks is secure, if only for operational complexity reasons.
So I think this case could do with rather more text.
-Ekr
Which hopefully covers this?
Sara
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