Hi Rich, I think that Kenny's slides only support the idea, that the draft should be Standards Track. In particular, the slide "The Coming Crypt-Apocalypse?" has a bullet: * And traffic captured now could be broken later, so it’s a problem *today* if you have data that needs to be kept secure for decades. That's the problem the draft solves. Regards, Valery. > Slides: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/slides-99-saag- > post-quantum-cryptography > > Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abmd1n5WUvc&t=1451s > > > On 12/11/19, 11:36 AM, "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluhrer@xxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > Did Kenny make this statement in the context of postquantum > cryptography (that is, public key algorithms that are believed to be secure > even if the adversary has a quantum computer)? > > That would certainly be a reasonable statement (as most postquantum > algorithms are fairly new, and are still being cryptographically vetted). > > On the other hand, this specific draft doesn't involve any postquantum > algorithms; it relies only on currently accepted algorithms, and so Kenny's > caution would not apply. > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Salz, Rich <rsalz@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2019 11:23 AM > > To: last-call@xxxxxxxx > > Cc: ipsec@xxxxxxxx; ipsecme-chairs@xxxxxxxx; > david.waltermire@xxxxxxxx; > > draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2@xxxxxxxx > > Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09.txt> (Postquantum > > Preshared Keys for IKEv2) to Proposed Standard > > > > We are seeing a flurry of these kind of “post quantum protection” > things. > > This is premature. The co-chair of the CFRG, Kenny Paterson, said so > awhile > > back. > > > > At best, this should be EXPERIMENTAL. > > > > I would like to see an IESG policy that makes all drafts on this topic be > > EXPERIMENTAL. > > > > -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
