Reviewer: Bernard Aboba
Review result: Ready with Nits
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I have not identified any transport related issues.
NITS
Expansion of acronyms on first use:
Abstract: TLS
Section 1: DNS
Section 2.1: ISP, QoS, MITM
Section 2
s/mutiple/multiple/
Section 2.1
s/fradulent/fraudulent/
Section 3.6
The downside is the the
client will not verify the identity of the fronting service with
risks discussed in , but solutions will have to mitigate this risks.
[BA] Several problems with this sentence:
s/the the/the/
s/this risks/the risk/
s/discussed in ,/discussed in [REF-TBD],/
Section 3.7.1
This section seems somewhat out of place in a section on Security
and Privacy Requirements for SNI Encryption, given that it relates
to hiding of the ALPN, and the text admits a weak case for linking
the two problems:
Using the same technique for hiding the ALPN and encrypting the SNI
may result in excess complexity. It might be preferable to encrypt
these independently.
You might consider moving this section to Section 4.3.1, under Section 4.3
Related Work.
Section 5
The first paragraph of this section strikes me as being potentially better
suited to inclusion in Section 1 Introduction.
Replacing clear text SNI transmission by an encrypted variant will
improve the privacy and reliability of TLS connections, but the
design of proper SNI encryption solutions is difficult. This
document does not present the design of a solution, but provides
guidelines for evaluating proposed solutions.