--On Tuesday, April 23, 2019 08:25 +1200 Brian E Carpenter
<brian.e.carpenter@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 10 or 20?
>
> Please remember that the threshold for the normal appeals
> process, which can involve up the following in extra work:
> WG Chairs, AD, IESG, IAB and ISOC Board
> is 1 person, who doesn't even have to be an active participant.
>
> Has the IETF been drowned by frivolous appeals? No.
Also remember that, between the publication of RFC 2027 in
October 1996 and RFC 3777 in June 2004, the number of
petitioners required to initiate a recall was one, with no
restriction on the prior participation, affiliations, etc., of
that person. The number of frivolous (or, for that matter,
non-frivolous) appeal efforts that got as far as forming a
recall committee during that period was, um, zero.
> Am I worried about a rush of frivolous recall petitions with
> SM's proposed change? No.
>
> Consider that for remote participants, contacting 9 other
> people and persuading them to sign a recall petition is a
> non-trivial task, comparable in difficulty to walking around
> at an IETF meeting and finding 19 such people.
Agreed. Note too that the current, 20 signature, process has
shown two things. One is that there have still been no appeals
(frivolous or not) that have gone through as far as the
formation of a recall committee. The other is a demonstration
of a specific, non-hypothetical case in which a mechanism for
removing key leadership figures could be needed to keep things
working.
Actually, I found another one of Mark's comments even more
problematic:
--On Monday, April 22, 2019 12:19 +1000 Mark Nottingham
<mnot@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> More importantly, perhaps, I think we also need to ask
> ourselves whether we want our leadership concerned about the
> possibility of a recall -- even if a failed one -- from a
> small, determined set of people. I imagine there are upsides
> and downsides to that.
First of all, the one case of near-recall (petitions ready,
process ready to roll) we've had clearly identified a situation
in which the community needed to have some mechanism to remove
an incumbent leader without, e.g., sitting around and waiting
for the next Nomcom cycle. Whether "the leadership" was
concerned about that or not, the possibility wasn't enough to
prevent the problem that put the process in motion. More
importantly, perhaps, let me turn your question around and ask
whether you think it would be a good idea to have our leadership
operate completely without accountability from whenever they are
selected by the Nomcom until their terms are up? I don't think
that a recall mechanism is ideal, but the Nomcom process
probably isn't ideal either and I'd hope that anyone proposing a
reduction in individual accountability would be thinking about
appropriate substitutes.
And, just my opinion, but high thresholds may be appropriate to
large bodies, e.g., legislatures or parliaments, where the
impact of one bad, out-of-control, or retired-in-place actor is
fairly low (even thought the offender's constituents may feel
otherwise). When one has a very small leadership team and no
other accountability mechanisms, it is far more important that
the recall mechanism be effective, usable, and perceived as
fair. There, too, it is worth remembering the IETF's history
where a small leadership group got seriously out of synch with
the community and turned out to be completely unaccountable, a
problem that could be solved only by tearing down our entire
organizational, leadership, and operational structures and
starting over.
best,
john
best,
john
john
