RE: [Dots] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-31

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@xxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, April 15, 2019 8:28 PM
> To: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@xxxxxxxxxx>;
> mohamed.boucadair@xxxxxxxxxx; secdir@xxxxxxxx
> Cc: draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel.all@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; dots@xxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [Dots] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-31
> 
> 
> 
> On 15/04/2019 15:38, Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy wrote:
> >> -----Original Message----- From: Dots <dots-bounces@xxxxxxxx> On
> >> Behalf Of Stephen Farrell Sent: Monday, April 15, 2019 6:56 PM To:
> >> mohamed.boucadair@xxxxxxxxxx; secdir@xxxxxxxx Cc:
> >> draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel.all@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx;
> >> dots@xxxxxxxx Subject: Re: [Dots] Secdir telechat review of
> >> draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-31
> >>
> >>
> >> Hiya,
> >>
> >> On 15/04/2019 14:16, mohamed.boucadair@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> >>>> - p13: The cuid still seems to me to be too static (there's a
> >>>
> >>> [Med] This is a feature not a bug. This scheme is particularly
> >>> useful to recover state, for example, upon reboot or crash of a DOTS
> >>> client.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Well, fair enough, but FWIW I'm not convinced that a client that can
> >> keep state (the private key and other dots stuff) couldn't also as
> >> easily keep a cuid value. And ISTM there should also be equally good
> >> ways to recommend for generating a cuid that don't have that
> >> 1:1 mapping to a key pair. All that said, it's not me needs to be
> >> convinced, but the IESG, so probably best to wait and see if they
> >> think this is worth changing or not before doing so.
> >
> > The advantage of the 1:1 mapping is the DOTS servers can validate the
> > DOTS client is not using the 'cuid' of another client.
> 
> So that'd be "an" advantage, if it is one;-)
> 
> But given the servers are supposed to authenticate the client via TLS client-auth
> (or else the server doesn't see the public key), I don't see the need.

The above validation helps defend against a compromised DOTS client using the 'cuid' of another DOTS client. 

-Tiru

> Nor do I recall that the server is supposed to compare the key to the cuid - if
> that check is to be done, then that'd need to be in the spec or a client that re-
> keys would have to make a new cuid. (Apologies if that's in the spec and I've
> forgotten it.)
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> 
> >
> > -Tiru
> >
> >>
> >> S.
> >>
> >




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