Thank you. Those changes nicely address my concerns.
Yours,
Joel
On 7/26/18 2:41 AM, Francesca Palombini wrote:
Hi Joel,
Thanks for your review! I now have updated the draft with improvements from your comments, see inline. Hope this clarifies.
Thanks,
Francesca
-----Original Message-----
From: core <core-bounces@xxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of Joel Halpern
Sent: den 20 juli 2018 04:08
To: gen-art@xxxxxxxx
Cc: draft-ietf-core-object-security.all@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; core@xxxxxxxx
Subject: [core] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review result: Ready
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review
Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for
the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.
For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-07-19
IETF LC End Date: 2018-07-30
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat
Summary: this document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard
RFC.
My minor concerns from draft -08 have been addressed.
Major issues: N/A
Minor issues:
Section 7.2 is about sequence numbers. The first sentence in 7.2 discusses
Nonces. Then the discussion switches to sequence numbers? My guess is
that the Nonce is left over from previous text?
Actually, the first sentence discusses nonces since they are constructed from Partial IVs, which are basically the Sequence Numbers. I added this precision, at the end of the second sentence.
OLD: An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs.
NEW: An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs (which encode the Sender Sequence Numbers, see Section 5).
Nits/editorial comments:
In the first paragraph of 3.3, the text reads:
The requirement that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security
contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context
guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.
Unfortunately, that is not a grammatical sentence.
I think this sentence was too long to be readable, so I tried to split it up. Hopefully it makes more sense now.
NEW: This means that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context; such a requirement guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.
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