Re: Is Fragmentation at IP layer even needed ?

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In message <56C5808C.1090906@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Masataka Ohta writes:
> Masataka Ohta (I) wrote:
> 
> > The RFC is a complete mess, in various ways. It says flow IDs are
> > good because it is random, but, at the same time, it says flow
> > IDs may not be random.
> 
> I found the rfc is even worse.
> 
> The most important thing the rfc must have stated (it
> does not, of course) is:
> 
> 	(SRC1, DST1, flow_ID1)
> 
> of a stateful flow MUST be unique (not used by packets
> not belonging to the flow) within the Internet,
> which can be guaranteed only by an end (source or
> destination), which is a straight forward manifestation
> of the end to end argument.
> 
> But, the rfc allow routers (firewalls) change flow IDs to
> nonzero value.
> 
> So, if a router changes flow ID of (SRC1, DST1, flow_ID2),
> from flow_ID2 to flow_ID3, then, there is a possibility
> that flow_ID1==flow_ID3, which is fatal for the stateful
> flow, if the modified packets are merged to the stateful
> flow (certain protection against merging possible but
> not robust against route changes).
> 
> Of course, section 6.1 of the rfc on covert channels is
> abstract nonsense, because covert channels may be created
> in various ways to carry information, for example, with
> extension headers (fragmentation boundaries, for example,
> can be arbitrary), which means firewalls should reject
> packets with extension headers.

No, it doesn't.  Firewalls have a purpose.  Most of the time the
purpose isn't to block communication.  It is to block wasting
resources or to try to prevent poorly written applications / ip
stacks being compromised.

Often people forget that firewalls need to let packets though that
are part of a legitimate communications flow through.  You don't
actually need to stop *every* potential packet that isn't part of
a communications flow.  You just need to make it hard enough that
it is not worth the effort to find the open paths if you are not
part of a legitimate flow.

> 					Masataka Ohta
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@xxxxxxx




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