On Wednesday, September 17, 2014, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@xxxxxx> wrote:
Richard Barnes writes:
> Perhaps, but is there benefits for leaving the alg without protection?
>
> Simplicity (if you omit protected headers altogether), and
> compatibility with other signed things. In the sense that you could
> transform one of them into a JWS without re-signing. This would
> apply, for example, to an X.509 certificate -- just parse the outer
> SEQUENCE, and re-assemble into a JWS with the tbsCertificate as
> payload. Same security properties that X.509 already has.
Ok, having this kind of information somewhere in the draft would help
to understand the reason. Also having text explaining that is
possible, and that the security properties of this option (i.e. no
problem with PKCS#1, etc... the text you had in the other email).
> It's also completely unnecessary for PKCS#1 signatures, which are
> the dominant use case today.
I agree.
> In general, I'm opposed to protocols baking in more
> application-specific logic than they need to. The point of JOSE is
> to describe the cryptographic operation that was performed, and
> carry the relevant bits around. Its job is not to fix all the
> weaknesses that every algorithm has.
Yes, but this property might have security issues, so they should be
covered by the security considerations section.
I'm perfectly happy to have it documented in the Security Considerations.
Mike: Should I generate some text, or do you want to take a stab?
--
kivinen@xxxxxx