Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-opsec-bgp-security-05.txt> (BGP operations and security) to Best Current Practice

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>   o  If an ROA is not found then the prefix SHOULD be accepted but
>      corresponding route SHOULD be given a low preference.
> 
> The draft isn't precise about what's meant by "ROA is not found", but probably it's the same as NotFound in RFC 7115 and 6811.

That’s indeed right. First publication of the draft is quite old now and we might have not adjusted vocabulary from what was happening in other docs that got published quicker.

> Assuming that's right, I'm curious what the rationale is for giving not-found routes a low preference?

I’ll start quoting section 5 of RFC7115:

 As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
 be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
 validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
 moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
 NotFound should decrease. Hence, an operator’s policy should not be
 overly strict and should prefer Valid announcements; it should attach
 a lower preference to, but still use, NotFound announcements, and
 drop or give a very low preference to Invalid announcements. Merely
 de-preferencing Invalid announcements is ill-advised; see previous
 paragraph.

> By definition, they don't compete with a route that is in any other state -- NotFound basically means there is no ROA that has anything to say about this prefix at all, so all routes for this prefix will be NotFound. 

What you say is intersting and I will cc Randy :-)

Actually I think the "lower preference" thing still makes some sense. I still see the case where you receive the routes from different peerings, for which you either check or do not check the received prefix against the ROA. I can give the below example:
  - An ISP would check all routes received from an IXP
  - This ISP would have a loose policy on its transit (with no verification because he trusts the transit provider)

The basic ISP policy would be to prefer the routes received through the IXP. But with the policy described in RFC7115 and repeated in the bgp-opsec draft the internet route would be prefered. I think this makes some sense and I’ve seen some similar things some years ago when we were doing route validation against the RADB.

> The net result is according to the draft's recommendation all routes for the prefix in question will be "accepted but ... given a low preference". The recommendation ends up being mostly harmless, but also not useful. 
> 
> (I say only *mostly* harmless since I guess some operator could be confused into thinking they're more secure than they actually are.)
> 
> Sorry for the late comment.

No problem, it’s an interesting point.
I’d personally keep it as-is (except « NotFound ») given the above example but I’m interested by what others think.

Thanks!

Jerome

> 
> Regards,
> 
> --John
> 
> P.S.: This shouldn't be construed as a full review of the document, which I haven't done.

--
Jerome Durand
Consulting Systems Engineer - Routing & Switching
jerduran@xxxxxxxxx  -  +33 6 35 11 60 50
blogs: http://reseauxblog.cisco.fr - http://ipv6blog.cisco.fr
twitter: @JeromeDurand
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