Review of draft-iab-filtering-considerations-06.txt, "Technical Considerations for Internet Service Blocking and Filtering"

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Hello,
At 08:16 29-01-2014, IAB Chair wrote:
This is a call for review of "Technical Considerations for Internet
Service Blocking and Filtering" prior to potential approval as an
IAB stream RFC.

From Section 4.1.3 of draft-iab-filtering-considerations-06:

  "If voice communication based on SIP [RFC3261] is blocked,
   users are likely to use proprietary protocols that allow them to talk
   to each other.  Some filtering systems are only capable of
   identifying IPv4 traffic and therefore by shifting to IPv6 users may
   be able to evade filtering.  Using IPv6 with header options, using
   multiple layers of tunnels, or using encrypted tunnels can also make
   it more challenging for blocking systems to find transport ports
   within packets, making port-based blocking more difficult.  Thus
   distribution and mobility can hamper efforts to block communications
   in a number of ways."

There is a case of SIP being blocked at http://www.onsip.com/blog/2013/07/02/in-depth-verizon-blocks-sip-traffic-using-alg I gather that the argument in the first sentence (see quoted text) is that users will use Skype. For what it i worth, there is an article at http://www.itwebafrica.com/telecommunications/335-africa/229496-skype-is-not-banned-in-ethiopia about a country which discussed a draft legislation allegedly affecting Skype. There is a case of a provider charging more money to unblock VoIP ( http://forum.vodafone.co.uk/t5/Pay-monthly-services/VoIP-SIP-Skype-Etc/td-p/729923 ). In my opinion, blocking voice traffic nowadays does not necessarily cause a shift to proprietary protocols as a proprietary service can still use a non-proprietary protocol.

Section 4.1.3 is about efficacy and how easy is it to avoid being blocked. In 2003, it was the view of the then-IAB that [filtering] or [preventing] the transmission of traffic based on the service identification within the traffic flow will have a limited effect. As mentioned in the quoted text, the adversary, the user in this case, can use "non-well-knownness" ports to evade filtering. It was also mentioned that SIP can use dynamically allocated service identifiers.

Thinking aloud, I would say that the first paragraph in Section 4.1.3 discusses about efficacy from a service end-point perspective. The second paragraph might be more about the efficacy of blocking by intermediaries. It is argued that the adversary will use a different port or encrypt the traffic. As a side-note, the user cannot shift to IPv6 or the user would be using IPv6 as a tunnel. The question is how effective is port blocking. I would use the following description:

   "Services may be tunneled within other services, proxied by a
    collaborating external host (e.g., an anonymous redirector),
    or simply run over an alternate port (e.g., port 8080 vs port
    80 for HTTP).  Another means of circumvention is alteration of
    the service behavior to use a dynamic port negotiation phase,
    in order to avoid use of a constant port address."

and have the encryption discussion in a separate paragraph.

What the people with the authority would like to have is an affective blocking mechanism. Are there any references about attempts to side-step what is being discussed in that paragraph?

From Section 4.2.1:

  "For residential or consumer networks with many egress points, the
   first challenge to obtaining this traffic is simply gaining access to
   the constituent packets.  The Internet is designed to deliver packets
   hop-by-hop from source to destination -- not to any particular point
   along the way.  In practice, inter-network routing is often
   asymmetric, and for sufficiently complex local networks, intra-
   network traffic flows can be asymmetric as well [asymmetry]."

As the "asymmetry" reference is to a pay-to-view paper I was unable to read it. I suggest finding a reference which the reader can access for free.

The first sentence mentions the challenge of gaining access to the user's packets. The second sentence discusses about the Internet being designed for hop-by-hop delivery, and it is followed by a mention of the asymmetry of inter-network routing. There is a (old) visual illustration of connectivity for North America at http://infosthetics.com/archives/cybergeography_book6.jpg My guess is that a visual illustration for the rest of the world would show a lower number of egress points.

I'll use http://www.renesys.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Sudan_Internet.png as an example. It's not that difficult to gain access access to the packets as the in-country network is not that complex. Is the discussion in Section 4.2.1 using a "cliché" [1]? I would look at (network-based blocking) scope from a collateral damage [2] vantage point.

From Section 4.2.4:

  "In sum, network-based blocking is only effective in a fairly
   constrained set of circumstances.  First, the traffic needs to flow
   through the network in such a way that the intermediary device has
   access to any communications it intends to block."

Is network-based blocking good enough to do the job? Given the extent of deployment of such measures I find it difficult to argue that it is only effective in a fairly constrained set of circumstances.

From the Conclusion section:

  "Because it least likely to create technical or architectural
   problems, endpoint-based blocking is the form of Internet service
   blocking that is least harmful to the Internet."

What are the architectural problems? I am asking the question as it is the sort of question that comes up in discussions about blocking traffic. Section 3.4 mentions that:

  "In the next section, blocking systems designed according to each of
   the three patterns -- network services, rendezvous services, and
   endpoints -- are evaluated for their technical and architectural
   implications."

A quick glance through Section 4 shows the following:

  "From an architectural perspective, however, they may create many of
   the same problems as network-based filtering conducted without
   consent."

  "If cooperation can be achieved, endpoint-based blocking can be much
   more effective than other approaches because it is so coherent with
   the Internet's architectural principles."

As a note, the document does not reference RFC 1958.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy

1. a phrase or opinion that is overused and betrays a lack of original thought.
2. http://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/papers/2012/July/2317307-2317311.pdf





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