I'm merely reporting what one international standard settled on. The point was just to note that the term attack is in use. I'll just note that what you use for threat is a threat actor in some usages, but not ISO 27000's. -- Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer, Communications Group Communications, Networks and Image Analysis Capability BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre West Hanningfield Road, Great Baddow, Chelmsford, CM2 8HN, UK Tel: +44 1245 242194 | Fax: +44 1245 242124 chris.dearlove@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx | http://www.baesystems.com BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Registered Office: Warwick House, PO Box 87, Farnborough Aerospace Centre, Farnborough, Hants, GU14 6YU, UK Registered in England & Wales No: 1996687 -----Original Message----- From: ietf [mailto:ietf-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Stephen Kent Sent: 16 December 2013 16:57 To: ietf@xxxxxxxx Subject: Re: Editorial thoughts on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02 ----------------------! WARNING ! ---------------------- This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an external partner or from the internet. Consider carefully whether you should click on any links, open any attachments or reply. Follow the 'Report Suspicious Emails' link on IT matters for instructions on reporting suspicious email messages. -------------------------------------------------------- Christopher, > ISO 27000 (Information technology - Security techniques - Information > security management systems - Overview and vocabulary) defiChristopher,nes both terms, and differently: > > 2.4 > attack > attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized > access to or make unauthorized use of an asset (2.3) > > 2.45 > threat > potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a > system or organization > The definition for attack seems appropriate. The definition for threat is not bad, but I prefer an older one, commonly used in the military context, and which matches with a trio of definitions for understanding security contexts: Vulnerability - a flaw in a design of implementation of a security-relevent protocol or system Attack - more of less as above Adversary - an entity with a set of motivations and capabilities to effect an attack Threat - a motivated, capable adversary. An adversary who is capable, but not motivated, is not a threat. An adversary who is motivated, but not capable, is not a threat. A threat model articulates adversaries and often enumerates classes of attacks, and then discusses the perceived motivation and ability of adversaries to effect attacks against a system of interest. We lack a threat model for the Internet. Most of our security protocols do not have published threat models (we didn't encourage this until recently) and what is published typically is an attack model, not a threat model. Most aspects of pervasive monitoring are indistinguishable from our traditional attack model, since that model already assumes adversaries that can engage in passive and active wiretapping. If we had a real threat model, either it would have included a discussion of nation states as adversaries with the capabilities to do what we have seen that they do, and a motivation to do so, or not. I'd like to see this document explicitly discuss this. Steve ******************************************************************** This email and any attachments are confidential to the intended recipient and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient please delete it from your system and notify the sender. You should not copy it or use it for any purpose nor disclose or distribute its contents to any other person. ********************************************************************