Jari I am wondering what the role of the IAB is in this. Statements of policy such as this I have seen previously from the IAB, as in the RFC2804 that has just been referenced. Whereas the IETF produces the engineering, such as TLS or IPsec, which is rather different in nature. Does the IAB approve or disapprove of this? Why isn't it involved? And when I look at the IAB website, I am bemused. The IAB is calling for papers for a conference on this precise topic, to be held in three months, by which time you want this I-D to be signed, sealed and delivered. So that the IAB can wave it at all participants and say 'Discussion over'? Or what? It seems to me that this I-D is an ideal candidate to be presented and discussed at the conference after which, the IAB can produced a carefully considered document. Tom Petch ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jari Arkko" <jari.arkko@xxxxxxxxx> To: <ietf@xxxxxxxx> Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2013 4:45 AM I wanted to draw your attention on this last call: > The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider > the following document: > - 'Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack' > <draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02.txt> as Best Current Practice > > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-farrell-perpass-attack/ It is a short read and important, so please comment. The last call ends in four weeks and covers holiday time, but we'll deal with this document on the January 9th telechat in the IESG, so in practice there should be enough time to comment. I would like to see this document as a high-level policy we have on dealing with this particular type of vulnerabilities in the Internet. A little bit like RFC 3365 "Danvers Doctrine" was on weak vs. strong security. Please remember that the details and tradeoffs for specific solutions are for our WGs to consider and not spelled out here. The draft does say "where possible" - I do not want to give the impression that our technology can either fully prevent all vulnerabilities or do it in all situations. There are obviously aspects that do not relate to communications security (like access to content by your peer) and there are many practical considerations that may not make it possible to provide additional privacy protection even when we are talking about the communications part. But I do believe we need to consider these vulnerabilities and do our best. Jari