<inline tp> ----- Original Message ----- From: <l.wood@xxxxxxxxxxxx> To: <l.wood@xxxxxxxxxxxx>; <ietf@xxxxxxxx> Sent: Monday, December 09, 2013 8:21 PM > Knives are easily available to anyone, just like encryption. ...and just like pervasive monitoring? In both, the product has already proliferated, and it is not possible to roll back to a state where it hasn't. Also, both of those have proven to have both too numerous and unquantifiable good and bad uses, and both of it in scale; there is no obvious, generally-accepted world-wide agreement that either of the two can only be used for nefarious purposes. So, I feel good comparing knives with pervasive monitoring. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/12/09/tech-giants-band-together-for-nsa -reform/ the irony of corporations that are profiting from pervasive monitoring - that's how Facebook and Google work - complaining about government pervasive monitoring is not lost on me. <tp> And that is another example of the use of encryption that I think may be abusive. Increasingly, I find that when I access a website, of some leisure interest, an https:// tunnel has been set up to Google, Facebook, Twitter or some such, which makes me think that they are acquiring personal information about me, information which I cannot see, perhaps for use in a way I will not approve of. It is like phishing, only different. And there seems to be no way of stopping it (short of a router ACL to prevent access to Google). Tom Petch </tp> What I don't feel good about is perpass-attack, which is going to be at best ignored, or wildly misinterpreted and misused by its intended audience. It's primarily a kneejerk reaction to news events to assuage the consciences of IETF insiders. also, do we get drafts through last call by simply now announcing in the draft that it has been through last call? That does make things easier. Must start writing 'this RFC' in drafts, which will help that benighted state come to pass. Lloyd Wood http://sat-net.com/L.Wood/