After discussion with the authors, the -07 version of this draft resolves the two issues in the Gen-ART review of the -06 version. In summary: - Text has been added to explain the relationship of the PATHSEC and BGPsec terms. - Citations have been added to the RFCs that explain the RPKI RP caching requirements. Thanks, --David > -----Original Message----- > From: Black, David > Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 8:25 PM > To: kent@xxxxxxx; achi@xxxxxxxxxx; General Area Review Team (gen-art@xxxxxxxx) > Cc: Black, David; stbryant@xxxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; sidr@xxxxxxxx > Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06 > > I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on > Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at > < http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. > > Please wait for direction from your document shepherd > or AD before posting a new version of the draft. > > Document: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06 > Reviewer: David L. Black > Review Date: September 23, 2012 > IETF LC End Date: September 23, 2012 > > Summary: This draft is on the right track, but has open issues > described in the review. > > This draft describes the threat model for BGP Path Security. The > draft generally reads well, but does contain quite a bit of serious > security analysis of an important routing protocol and hence requires > both security and routing expertise to fully understand. > > Major issue: > > This draft contains more than just a threat model. It also contains > a high level security analysis of the security architecture/approach > that applies the RPKI to secure use of BGP. That analysis appears to > be good, but it's somehow disconnected from the rest of the sidr WG's > work, by what I hope is simply a terminology problem: > - This draft refers to the security architecture/approach for > BGP as PATHSEC. > - Many of the other sidr WG draft refer to that security as > BGPsec > In effect, the PATHSEC security architecture/approach appears to be > implicit in this draft. > > Something's missing - if those two terms were meant to be the same, > BGPsec should probably be used in this draft, otherwise, the relationship > should be described. I've tagged this as a major issue, as it makes > text like the following in Section 4.2 rather unclear: > > Stale Path Announcement: If PATHSEC-secured announcements can > expire, such an announcement may be propagated with PATHSEC data > that is "expired". This behavior would violate the PATHSEC goals > and is considered a type of replay attack. > > What is "PATHSEC data"? What are "the PATHSEC goals"? The statement > in the abstract that " We use the term PATHSEC to refer to any BGP > path security technology that makes use of the RPKI" doesn't seem to > answer these questions. > > Minor Issue: > > Section 4.4 seems somewhat loose on caching by RPs, considering the > importance of that caching in countering a number of the attacks described > in that section - in multiple cases, RP detection of an attack relies > upon the RP noticing that something has changed at the publication point > wrt the RP's cached copy in a fashion that should not have happened. > > Statements such as "the RPKI calls for RPs to cache" and "RPs are > expected to make use of local caches" strike me as a weak foundation > for the level of security dependence on that caching. A pointer to a > SHOULD or MUST requirement for caching by RPKI RPs in another document > would alleviate this concern; surely that language exists somewhere. > > Nits/editorial comments: > > Also in Section 4.4: > > (The RP would be very unhappy if > there is no CRL for the CA instance anyway.) > > Please rewrite to describe how the RP reacts to failure to find a CRL > - the RP surely does something in addition to becoming "very unhappy" ;-). > Some of that may already be in the sentence immediately following the > "very unhappy" text. > > idnits 2.12.17 complains about a missing reference: > > == Missing Reference: 'TCPMD5' is mentioned on line 114, but not defined > > That citation is embedded in a quote from RFC 4272, nonetheless, [TCPMD5] > should be informatively referenced here - it was RFC 2385, which has been > obsoleted by RFC 5925, which is referenced here. The fact that RFC 2385 > is obsolete will generate a different idnits warning, which is ok to ignore. > > Thanks, > --David > ---------------------------------------------------- > David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer > EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA 01748 > +1 (508) 293-7953 FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786 > david.black@xxxxxxx Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754 > ---------------------------------------------------- >