Re: [spfbis] [dnsext] Obsoleting SPF RRTYPE

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On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 12:52 PM, David Conrad <drc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
SPF using TXT and hence, SPFBIS forces the uniquification of the DNS response into the application instead of in the DNS library. Given the ordering of individual TXT RRs within an RRset is not guaranteed, I suspect the chances that every application is going to do that parsing correctly is relatively low (btw, the example in 3.3 in spfbis-14 is a bit misleading: assuming "second string" is in a separate TXT RR (which is implied), the concatenation might be "second stringv=spf1 ..... first").  The more interesting bit is if/when another protocol uses TXT at the same ownername.

Yes, I understand all of that, and I've written code to deal with it.  It's not rocket science.
 
The RR has been allocated and it is supported in most DNS servers and resolver libraries in one form or another.  Provisioning systems take much longer, but that isn't surprising and shouldn't be an argument to deprecate (if it is, we might as well close the RRtype registry for new entries).

We're not only talking about provisioning systems here.  We're also talking about interference with queries and replies at the DNS protocol level.  The survey work done for RFC6686 showed that something on the order of thousands of domains in the sample set suffered from this.  It is a very real issue for a deployed protocol.
 
In the past, the IETF used to make decisions based on long-term technical/architectural correctness, even in the face of pragmatic complications (e.g., the choice to mandate strong crypto despite real world challenges some companies faced in exporting that crypto in products). In this particular case, there seems to be an argument to explicitly disallow the long-term technically/architecturally correct approach because some folks choose not to add an RR to their zone files or support that RR in their provisioning systems.  As I said in DNSEXT, this seems like the wrong approach to me.

All things being equal, I would agree with you.  And if SPF were starting anew today, I suspect I might have a different opinion.  The question, then, is the weight of the mitigating circumstances, which obviously the two communities evaluate quite differently.

-MSK

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