Hi, Eliot, On 04/22/2013 01:20 AM, Eliot Lear wrote: > In the process of doing the apps area review, I came across some points > that were not related to applications. The basis for these comments is > precisely the sentiment that Russ Housley expressed, which is that the > specification is done when there is no more to remove. I'd probaby disagree with such statement. One thing is removing tuff from the mechanism or algorithm that you're standardizing, in the hopes of keeping it simple (this one I'd agree with). Another is removing text from specifications, which essentially means that the gut implementing the spec has more to figure out by himself, and hence more chances for failures. > With this > document, I wonder if quite a bit could be removed. > > Specifically, a great deal of discussion goes into the PRF involving DAD > counters, etc, when all that is needed is a suitable PRF. Not sure what you mean...What's thetext that you think could/should be removed? > The draft in > fact says this in Section 3 after an explanation of the inputs. Any PRF > that follows the guidelines of RFC 4086 should do fine and not cause > interoperability OR security problems. If you're referring to the text that explains why we're not mandating any specific PRF, that text is there because the issue was raisen in the wg, > Also, the following text in section 3 Page 7 is contorted: > > This means that this document does not formally obsolete or > deprecate any of the existing algorithms to generate Interface IDs > (e.g. such as that specified in [RFC2464]). However, those IPv6 > implementations that employ this specification must generate all > of their "stable" addresses as specified in this document. > > My suggestion is to simplify remove it as it is self-evident. What's the part that is evident? The one about not deprecating existing algorithms? -- Because the other ne certainly isn't: if you're going to use this algorithm for generating addresses *in addition* to those generated by traditional SLAAC, then this document wouldn't mitigate address-scanning attacks. > Finally, this algorithm requires that the resultant host portion be 64 > bits. Is that necessary? Well, yes- If the PRF produces a bit string larger than 64 bits, and you say nothing about how you grab the IID, then the algorithm is underspecified. The easier it is for a developer to go through this document and come up with an implementation, the better. The more the open questions, the worse. Thanks, -- Fernando Gont SI6 Networks e-mail: fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492