On 8/2/2012 1:24 PM, David Conrad wrote:
> On Aug 2, 2012, at 11:44 AM, jnc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Noel Chiappa) wrote:
>>> we should instead focus on the ways that the technical architecture of
>>> the Internet creates control points that are vulnerable to capture and
>>> consider ways in which those control points can be made capture-proof.
>>
>> Agreed.
>
> The challenge of course is that one of the simple/efficient mechanisms to implement desirable features (e.g., security, scalability, manageability) is to create hierarchies, but those very hierarchies provide control points that can (at least in theory) be captured. The DNS root is one such, the proposed RPKI root is another. Perhaps a variation of the Software Engineering Dilemma ("fast, good, cheap: pick two") applies to Internet architecture: secure, scalable, manageable: pick two?
>
>>> If the ITU-T wants to also be in the business of handing out IPv6
>>> address names then give then a /21 or a /16 and tell them to go
>>> party.
>
> I don't think this is what the ITU is after. My impression is that the ITU is arguing that member states should get the /<whatever> directly.
>
>> I basically agree. It could have negative impacts on the routing, by impacting
>> route aggregatability, but it can hardly be worse that those bletcherous PI
>> addresses, so if it makes them happy to be in charge of a large /N, why not?
>
> I believe the routing scalability risk lies not in the allocation body, but rather the policies imposed around the allocations. That is, imagine a world of 200+ National Internet Registries instead of 5 Regional Internet registries. If the government behind an NIR then decides that to use the Internet in their country, you must use addresses allocated by the NIR of that country, you then run the risk of having 200+ prefixes for each entity that operates globally. This risk could be addressed if it didn't matter where you get your addresses, however that isn't true with the existing model and there are political pressures that would likely ensure that it would not be true in the NIR model.
>
> There are also risks associated with upkeep of registration data, which is already a challenge with the existing limited set of registries. I imagine this would get worse with more registries.
In addition to the very valid points that David made, there are also
other risks. Such as, if the national government is the only source of
IP addresses then they have much greater control over who can get on the
network in-country. And if all of the traffic from a given country is
coming into my country via the same prefix it makes it that much easier
to apply censorship, tariffs, etc.
The whole concept of a global network, with no centralized control, that
permits (nay, encourages) the free flow of information is anathema to
many national governments. They are desperate to choke that off, by any
means necessary.
Doug
--
I am only one, but I am one. I cannot do everything, but I can do
something. And I will not let what I cannot do interfere with what
I can do.
-- Edward Everett Hale, (1822 - 1909)