John, I don't see how you took what I said and then interpreted it as suggesting that I was saying proposing an "absolute dictatorship". You do have a good imagination :-) Also, I have been proposing some other ways of solving the I* overload problems as you suggested, except that I don't think the solution to the I* overload problem is in the IASA. If we (the community) are going to solve the I* overload problem, it would be good to have some actual data on how the I* chairs spend their time. It would be good to have a better understanding of the problem before proposing solutions. Bob > > > --On Friday, September 23, 2011 11:04 +0300 Bob Hinden > <bob.hinden@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>> I also claim that for the third item there is no necessity >>> for the I* chairs to be a voting member, nor for the fourth. >>> That said, I am sensitive to the argument that if I* chairs >>> are members they may actually pay more attention (human >>> nature and such) and that being effective at those item >>> without being a member is tough. >> >> I theory I can agree, but in practice I think the more >> separation there is the more likelihood for organizational >> problems. >> ... > > Bob, > > Of course. But that is just a corollary to an old principle > that, if one wants a really efficient government, with minimal > chances of "organizational problems", the most efficient form is > an absolute dictatorship (or an absolute monarchy) with one > person in charge of, and responsible for, everything. As long > as that person is competent and has the bandwidth, things are > nothing if not efficient and, some aesthetic and moral issues > aside, the only major disadvantages are that there is a single > point of failure for the entire system and recruiting > appropriate dictators (or monarchs) has a long history of being > problematic. > > We have chosen, I think for really good reasons, to avoid that > sort of model. That --almost inherently-- means that there will > be some inefficiency and some risk of organizational problems. > Frankly, I'd rather have that risk in the IASA, than having it > affect the ability of the IAB and IESG to do substantive > (standards and external relationship) work. That doesn't mean I > want an inefficient and organizationally-troubled IASA, only > that, if there is pain, I think that the IASA --which, should it > become necessary, is also more easily reorganized without > significant disruption to the IETF's work than the IESG or IAB-- > is the right place to feel, and deal with, that pain. For that > reason, I'd much prefer to to have IASA leaders saying "well > this might be bad for the IASA, but we've thought about it and > these are ways to make the best of a bad situation" rather than > what often seem to be variations on a theme of "the IASA (IAOC, > Trust) are so much more important than anything else that, if > something has to suffer inefficiency or organizational problems, > it should obviously be the IAB and IESG". > > I don't think you really intend to say that, but it is what some > of your (and other) comments come out sounding like. YMMD. > > john > > > > > _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf