Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > There is a big difference in real engineering (i.e. outside a > university) between a solution that only addresses part of a problem > and one that is 'useless'. > In observed attacks and in simulations, the IP-AS number attack is > much more significant than the routing layer attack in most > circumstances. I'm not sure what are the IP-AS attack and the routing layer attack and whether you are worrying about attacks today or year 3010. So, before continuing discussion, I think you should write a draft precisely defining problems including the attacks. The draft may be more than 100 pages long. It should be noted, however, that, it is likely that I point out the attacks are identical, if I have enough time to read everal lines of the draft. > There are many security concerns that BGP security could address. The > only concerns for which a BGP security solution is essential is to > prevent Denial of Service attacks and to prevent hijacking of IPv4 > space The point of previous discussion was that RPKI is useless for such prevention. Read the ML log. > after exhaustion is reached. With A+P, it will be reached in year 3010 or later. Masataka Ohta _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf