Re: DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Masataka-san

Please learn to express your opinions in a manner that is appropriate
to a professional forum rather than a bar room brawl.

You are entitled to your opinion but not to converse in the abusive
and insulting manner you have chosen to use if you wish to receive a
reply.

The link you gave was to a paywalled version of the paper. I did not
bother to read the authors once I discovered it was paywalled.


On Mon, Jun 8, 2009 at 1:22 AM, Masataka
Ohta<mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> I was at a dinner with Dave Clarke last week. Those who invoke his
>> name in these arguments rarely seem to have read his paper on the end
>> to end principle IN NETWORKING.
>
> Which paper is, are you saying, "his paper"? The original one or
> latter one (published in 2001) which includes discussion on PKI,
> which I referred in previous mails.
>
> As you say "IN NETWORKING", I'm afraid you haven't read his original
> paper "END-TO-END ARGUMENTS IN SYSTEM DESIGN", which is on "system
> design" in general and not necessarily "in networking". For example,
> in the original paper, RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) is
> given as an example of end to end design.
>
>> Depending on your level of abstraction you choose to work at you can
>> argue that anything is an end.
>
> Apparently, he taught you basic points in his original paper
> but not beyond.
>
> It is discussed in the original paper that:
>
>        Identifying the ends
>        Using the end-to-end argument sometimes requires subtlety
>        of analysis of application requirements.
>        one must use some care to identify the end points to which
>        the argument should be applied.
>
> Beyond the original paper, the application of the end to end
> argument to PKI including DNSSEC is discussed in his latter
> paper in 2001 with PROPERLY IDENTIFIED "end points". In the
> paper, certificate authorities are identified to be third
> parties.
>
> With the discussion, there is no point denying "DNSSEC is NOT
> secure end to end".
>
>> It would be nice if the paper was available in unencumbered form.
>
> Both of the papers are freely downloadable.
>
> The original paper:
>
> http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf
>
> The paper in 2001:
>
> http://www.csd.uoc.gr/~hy558/papers/Rethinking_2001.pdf
>
> You should have read both of them to make the dinner more valuable.
>
>> Publication in ACM does not help anything but the author's academic
>> career.
>
> I gave a link to the paper in 2001 through ACM because it has DOI,
> assuming that anyone can use search engines and that all the people
> who talks about the end to end principle should have read the
> original paper in advance.
>
>                                                Masataka Ohta
>
>



-- 
-- 
New Website: http://hallambaker.com/
View Quantum of Stupid podcasts, Tuesday and Thursday each week,
http://quantumofstupid.com/
_______________________________________________

Ietf@xxxxxxxx
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf


[Index of Archives]     [IETF Annoucements]     [IETF]     [IP Storage]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux SCTP]     [Linux Newbies]     [Fedora Users]