Re: Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-14

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Ben,

Thanks for your review. With respect to the HTTP issue you raise, is your claim that the HTTP binding prevents the use of Digest or Basic based on this sentence from Section 6.3?

"
HELD error messages MUST be carried by a 200 OK HTTP/HTTPS response.
"

If so, then I think that's a misinterpretation that calls for a clarification. The authors should feel free to correct me, but I think that HTTP-level errors (e.g., the need for authentication, or even a LIS not listening at a given path) can still generate other HTTP response codes (e.g., 401 or 404). It's just that if the only thing that's gone wrong is at the HELD layer -- if it's the positioning that failed, not the communications -- then you have to use a 200.

Assuming that all the above is accurate, proposed text:
"
HELD error messages MUST be carried by a 200 OK HTTP/HTTPS response. (Other response codes may still be generated at the HTTP layer, if the problem is with the HTTP part of the message, not the HELD part. For instance, if the request needs to be authenticated with Basic or Digest authentication, the server may issue a 401 Unauthorized response as a challenge, or if the indicated path is not valid, then the server may issue a 404 Not Found.)
"

Cheers,
--Richard




Ben Campbell wrote:
I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-14
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2009-06-04
IETF LC End Date: 2009-06-09
IESG Telechat date: (if known)

Summary:

This draft is ready for publication as a proposed standard. I have a few editorial and clarity comments that might could slightly improve the draft, but can safely be ignored. Additionally, I have one comment highlighting a "feature" that is not necessarily a problem, but is architecturally important enough that I want to make sure the IESG thinks about it.

Major issues: None.

Minor issues:

-- There is one feature of HELD that the ADs should explicitly think about: The HTTP binding forbids LIS reliance on HTTP digest or basic authentication. If I understand correctly, this means effectively that the _only_ method for client authentication is the built in reverse routeability test. I am agnostic as to whether this is sufficient.

Nits/editorial comments:

-- section 4, paragraph 1:

Please expand (and reference) PIDF-LO on first mention.

-- Section 6.2, value list:

-- In my previous review, I was confused as to the relationship between the geodetic/civic and LoBV/LoBR choices. I think it's worth some clarification in this section that geodetic and civic imply LoBV. -- section 9.3, 5th paragraph: "A temporary spoofing of IP address could mean that a device could request a Location Object or Location URI that would result in another Device's location."

It might be worth clarifying that (if I understand correctly) that this is more than a spoofing attack, in that the attacker must not only spoof its source address, but must be able to receive packets sent to the spoofed address?

-- same paragraph: "... re-use of the Device's
   IP address could result in another Device receiving the original
   Device's location rather than its own location."

It seems like this problem is pretty unlikely to occur by _accident_ when HELD is used over TCP (the only binding right now), right? And certain not to happen over TLS? Might be worth a "mitigating" mention.

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