Ben,
Thanks for your review. With respect to the HTTP issue you raise, is
your claim that the HTTP binding prevents the use of Digest or Basic
based on this sentence from Section 6.3?
"
HELD error messages MUST be carried by a 200 OK HTTP/HTTPS response.
"
If so, then I think that's a misinterpretation that calls for a
clarification. The authors should feel free to correct me, but I think
that HTTP-level errors (e.g., the need for authentication, or even a LIS
not listening at a given path) can still generate other HTTP response
codes (e.g., 401 or 404). It's just that if the only thing that's gone
wrong is at the HELD layer -- if it's the positioning that failed, not
the communications -- then you have to use a 200.
Assuming that all the above is accurate, proposed text:
"
HELD error messages MUST be carried by a 200 OK HTTP/HTTPS response.
(Other response codes may still be generated at the HTTP layer, if the
problem is with the HTTP part of the message, not the HELD part. For
instance, if the request needs to be authenticated with Basic or Digest
authentication, the server may issue a 401 Unauthorized response as a
challenge, or if the indicated path is not valid, then the server may
issue a 404 Not Found.)
"
Cheers,
--Richard
Ben Campbell wrote:
I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.
Document: draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-14
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2009-06-04
IETF LC End Date: 2009-06-09
IESG Telechat date: (if known)
Summary:
This draft is ready for publication as a proposed standard. I have a few
editorial and clarity comments that might could slightly improve the
draft, but can safely be ignored. Additionally, I have one comment
highlighting a "feature" that is not necessarily a problem, but is
architecturally important enough that I want to make sure the IESG
thinks about it.
Major issues: None.
Minor issues:
-- There is one feature of HELD that the ADs should explicitly think
about: The HTTP binding forbids LIS reliance on HTTP digest or basic
authentication. If I understand correctly, this means effectively that
the _only_ method for client authentication is the built in reverse
routeability test. I am agnostic as to whether this is sufficient.
Nits/editorial comments:
-- section 4, paragraph 1:
Please expand (and reference) PIDF-LO on first mention.
-- Section 6.2, value list:
-- In my previous review, I was confused as to the relationship between
the geodetic/civic and LoBV/LoBR choices. I think it's worth some
clarification in this section that geodetic and civic imply LoBV.
-- section 9.3, 5th paragraph: "A temporary spoofing of IP address could
mean that a device could request a Location Object or Location URI that
would result in another Device's location."
It might be worth clarifying that (if I understand correctly) that this
is more than a spoofing attack, in that the attacker must not only spoof
its source address, but must be able to receive packets sent to the
spoofed address?
-- same paragraph: "... re-use of the Device's
IP address could result in another Device receiving the original
Device's location rather than its own location."
It seems like this problem is pretty unlikely to occur by _accident_
when HELD is used over TCP (the only binding right now), right? And
certain not to happen over TLS? Might be worth a "mitigating" mention.
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