To the IETF mailing list subscribers:
The US government involvement in DNSSEC operations is almost certainly
not in-scope for the ietf mailing list. Thus, it would be
counterproductive to start a discussion based on Mr. Baptista comments
on this topic (hence no in-line comments in the original message below).
However, the question remains: which forum, if any, is appropriate for a
discussion? I don't have the answer, so I merely share the following
observations.
A) ICANN was specifically requested to abstain from public consultations
about its proposal to deploy DNSSEC at the root. This is in a letter
from US Department of Commerce to ICANN, ref
http://www.icann.org/correspondence/baker-to-twomey-09sep08.pdf (filed
among other documents in http://www.icann.org/correspondence/ ).
B) The US Department of Commerce issued a public comment notice (the
deadline is now past), see http://www.ntia.doc.gov/DNS/DNSSEC.html .
This forum has been used by Mr. Baptista. I was favourably impressed by
the material written by NTIA staff (and published in the Federal
Register), so I would recommend this reading (at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/frnotices/2008/FR_DNSSEC_081009.pdf ). However,
this "forum" is not really interactive.
C) Some other forums on which DNSSEC protocol and operational aspects
are discussed frequently avoid and/or terminate discussions about US
government involvement in DNSSEC operations for the DNS root. I do not
blame their moderator or anybody else, I'm just reporting an observation.
D) If any stakeholder group or representatives see some effectiveness in
the WSIS, the discussions on DNSSEC deployment would fall under the
heading "critical Internet resources." I don't see much potential for
active discussion on this front, but it's only my opinion.
So, that's it. Anybody has other suggestions for an appropriate forum
for DNSSEC deployment at the root *including* US government involvement?
Regards,
- Thierry Moreau
Joe Baptista wrote:
DNSSEC indeed violates the end to end principle. It's simply that
simple. And it asks us to put our trust in the root a.k.a. ICANN. I
don't think governments world wide are going to put their trust and
faith in ICANN. The U.S. Government is the only government that has
been bamboozled into adopting DNSSEC into .gov infrastructure.
I wonder how President Obama would feel about handing over the keys to
U.S. Government infrastructure to a U.S. contractor. I'd have trouble
sleeping at night if that was the case.
I've addressed this at length in my comments to the NTIA.
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/DNS/comments/comment034.pdf
If the U.S. government wants DNSSEC today then it must nationalize the
roots. I don't even trust Vixie with the root. I remember when he
hijacked the root with Postel. Or as they put it "we were only running
an experiment".
In any case the new infrastructure campaign demands U.S. government
roots be set up to exclusively serve U.S. network infrastructure.
regards
joe baptista
p.s. If you want to secure the DNS end to end - think DNSCurve - not DNSSEC.
http://dnscurve.org/
On Sat, May 30, 2009 at 7:27 PM, Masataka Ohta
<mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
<mailto:mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
Francis Dupont wrote:
> => not only this is very arguable (for instance about the resource
> exhaustion) but no hop-by-hop/channel security, even something as
> strong as TSIG, can provide what we need, i.e., end-to-end/object
> security (*).
Unless your meaning of end-to-end differs from that of David Clark,
the following argument of his paper is applicable to DNSSEC.
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=383034.383037
Rethinking the design of the Internet:
The end to end arguments vs. the brave new world
The certificate is an assertion by that (presumably
trustworthy) third party that the indicated public key
actually goes with the particular user.
These certificates are principal components of essentially
all public key schemes,
That is, security of DNSSEC involves third parties and is not end
to end.
> PS (*): I use the common meaning of end-to-end, not Masataka
Ohta's one.
I'm afraid you don't know who David Clark is and how he is related
to the end to end argument.
However, all the people who are qualified to discuss end to end do
know him and his argument.
Masataka Ohta
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Joe Baptista
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www.publicroot.org <http://www.publicroot.org>
PublicRoot Consortium
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