Re: [OPSEC] [tcpm] draft-gont-tcp-security

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Donald,

I'm confused by your post. You appear to believe that TCP is intended to
be secure. Note that TCP does not require either the MD5 or AO extension.

Smith, Donald wrote:
> 
> (coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
> Donald.Smith@xxxxxxxxx gcia   
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: opsec-bounces@xxxxxxxx [mailto:opsec-bounces@xxxxxxxx] 
>> On Behalf Of Fernando Gont
>> Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 1:23 PM
>> To: Joe Touch
>> Cc: tcpm@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; Joe Abley; opsec@xxxxxxxx; 
>> Lars Eggert; Eddy,Wesley M. (GRC-RCN0)[Verizon]
>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] [tcpm] draft-gont-tcp-security
>>
>> Joe Touch wrote:
>>
>>>> So we had tcp-secure in 2004, icmp-attacks in 2005, a claim for a
>>>> trivial attack in 2008 (Outpost24/CERT-FI), and we'll 
>> probably continue
>>>> in this line, because we do nothing about it.
>>> Whether we have this document or not, we will continue to 
>> have people
>>> who incorrectly assume that TCP is secure.
> 
> Secure is a general term. TCP was intended to address several areas of security.
> The classic tenets for computer security is:
> CIA -> Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
> TCP doesn't attempt to address Confidentiality.
> However it was designed to address integrity and availability so 
> failures in those areas should be documented and addressed in some
> fashion.

Can you explain this? Where is the integrity protection? Where is the
availability specified?

...
>> It's security/resiliency can be improved. After all, if that were not
>> the case, I guess you're wasting your time with TCP-AO. Or is it that
>> you believe the only way to improve a protocol is to throw 
>> crypto at it?
> 
> Adding crypto improves confidentiality and integrity but is counter
> productive to availability as most
> crypto engines are prone to fairly low pps resource exhaustion
> attacks.

All prevention methods are susceptible to computational resource
attacks, since all increase the operations performed on a packet. It is
commonly assumed that this is a desirable tradeoff, and that the
computational resources can be totally protected with line-rate
dedicated computation (e.g., hardware assist).

Joe
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