-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, Mike (et al.), Michael StJohns wrote: > Hi Joe - ... > At 02:18 PM 10/2/2008, Joe Touch wrote: > >> First, I don't agree with this document's recommendation in section 7.3.1. >> >> TCP's current definition of a connection is: >> >> local IP address >> remote IP address >> local port >> remote port >> protocol (e.g., TCP) >> >> I don't agree that treating each sensitivity level as a separate virtual >> network (Sec 3 of this ID) is the appropriate analogy. If that were the >> case, we'd need to redefine every Internet protocol to understand the >> pair [address, sensitivity level] as an identifier, and that is not >> realistic. Further, if we did need to do such an extension, there are >> other equally (or arguably more) worthy candidates, notably VPN-ID. > > The issue isn't so much the network, but how the host views it and > deals with resources that might otherwise be in multiple sensitivity > domains. > > Consider a multi-level host that runs at both SECRET and TOP SECRET. > Consider that it wants to run some protocol to send and receive data > from other hosts, some multi level, some single level SECRET and some > single level TOP SECRET. > > A single level process at TOP SECRET does a passive open of the port > (call it 666) and waits for connections. > A second single level process at SECRET also attempts to do a passive > open to the same port - but gets blocked because the port resource is > being held by the TOP SECRET process. The SECRET process now has one bit > of information about the TOP SECRET part of the host. By grabbing and > releasing port resources, the TS process can signal data to processes at > lower security levels. Understood. However, the lower security process can't know whether it's the TS process doing this or some other reason (port blocked, e.g.); all it knows is that it can't connect at the level it wants on the port it wants. ... > The fix was to virtualize TCP so that there was a complete set of TCP > ports per distinct security domain. I agree that this fixes your problem, but what it does is create a new naming dimension to the entire Internet, and I don't think that this is feasible. Perhaps you'd prefer to black-hole the SYNs at the wrong security level, which would still modify 793, but would not create the naming dimension problem that concerns me... >> I.e., I don't think this needs to update 793 - it needs to redefine the >> Internet architecture in places like 1122, 1123, and 1812, and flow down >> through all protocols they impact to make this sort of change, and I >> don't see a reason to do so solely for this issue. >> >> Overall, I see no reason why 793's current rules aren't sufficient to >> emulate the desirable separation of sensitivity levels without extending >> this to true virtualization. I.e., the current rule (in 793, sec 3.6, >> paraphrased): >> >> - match the levels proposed by both ends of the connection >> where there is a mismatch, terminate the connection >> >> I.e., I don't see how to extend TCP to support concurrent connections >> with matching connection identifiers on different sensitivity levels >> without rearchitecting the entire Internet. AFAICT, it's sufficient to >> allow each TCP connection to have exactly one sensitivity level, as is >> already currently required. > > Not quite the point. If you have a single level process reserving a > TCP port, then the port has sensitivity level of the process. If you > have a multi-level process reserving a port then the port can have > one, some or all of the sensitivity levels of the process. Each > instantiation of a connection does have one and only one sensitivity > level. I understand that this wasn't your point (or goal), but I'm claiming it's the effect of your goal - and that it's untenable. > The changes don't have to happen on the entire internet, just those > hosts and routers that are CIPSO aware AND multi-level. If the host is > CIPSO aware (or for that matter IPSO aware), but not multi-level, it's > just looking for the specific label and doesn't have to deal with the > multiple virtual network cruft. The changes need to happen for all RFCs that are affected by naming - you're adding a dimension to naming by expecting different TCP connections to occur where the only difference is security level. At that point, the same has to happen for ICMP (so PMTUD works for each TCP separately), which means you modify 1122. The same has to happen for user apps, which now need to be able to connect to different sockets for the same socket-pair - which modifies 1123. The same happens for 1812, ... That's the problem. Naming dimension extensions creep into the architecture. Joe >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) >> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org >> >> iEYEARECAAYFAkjlEGkACgkQE5f5cImnZruKoQCfZ9qnOBIRZTCNzsUWzfB39HdL >> AicAn1kLwAQdQ087x9H32tbdVK26t1Hq >> =8u6k >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> _______________________________________________ >> Ietf mailing list >> Ietf@xxxxxxxx >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkjlUFMACgkQE5f5cImnZrtk+gCghuu9R1AYnhNaaHZ/72Rfv4WC EVQAoNV2aDQE3gYsl6+T9lWDbcqNbAaL =KKNw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf