Re: IETF Last Call on Walled Garden Standard for the Internet

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Re: IETF Last Call on Walled Garden Standard for the Internet 
(draft-ietf-hokey-emsk-hierarchy)

The open nature of the Internet has been a problem for quite a long
time.  In addition to the countless problems caused by allowing users 
to run applications of their choosing, the Internet also allows users
to access content worldwide, some of which may not be approved of by
local, state or national governments, warlords, or gangsters. 

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has further compounded
the problem by creating interoperable standards for security, which
have enabled hosts on the Internet to protect traffic end-to-end
or hop-by-hop.  This has not only harmed vendor profitability by
requiring vendors to interoperate with each other, but
by enabling users to take ownership of their own security 
without the approval of operators or governmental authorities,
criminal activity, terrorism, and juvenile delinquincy have 
flourished. 

While these issues have long been recognized by the U.N.
Working Group on Internet Governance, until recently, 
the IETF has shown little interest in solving these 
problems. 

It is therefore with great pleasure that I have read
draft-ietf-hokey-emsk-hierarchy, which finally offers
a solution to the issues that have bedeviled the Internet.

How does this document work its magic?  As noted in the
Introduction:

   This document defines the EMSK to be used solely for
   deriving root keys using the key derivation specified.  The root keys
   are meant for specific purposes called usages; a special usage class
   is the domain specific root keys made available to and used within
   specific key management domains....  

   Different uses for keys derived from the EMSK have been proposed.
   Some examples include hand off across access points in various mobile
   technologies, mobile IP authentication and higher layer application
   authentication. 

In other words, this document creates a standard for the use of EAP
in application layer security, enabling operators and governments to 
tie the use of applications to link layer authentication mechanisms
under their control.  With EAP now implemented within network 
interface cards, this gives operators and governments granular
control of what applications can be run on the Internet.

Of course, the solution would not be complete by also allowing 
vendors or other SDOs to create their own security solutions
without IETF review, while still being able to claim IETF
standards compliance. How is this wonderful outcome accomplished? 
Section 8.1 states:

   Labels within the "ietf.org" organization are assigned based on the
   IETF CONSENSUS policy with specification recommended.  Labels from
   other organizations may be registered with IANA by the person or
   organization controlling the domain with an assignment policy of
   SPECIFICATION REQUIRED.   

In other words, vendors and SDOs can self-assign labels, creating
their own key hierarchies, without being required to register with 
IANA. 

A NOTE TO THE NAYSAYERS

There are naysayers who will note that the document, by
enabling use of EAP as a universal application layer security 
mechanism for the Internet, has exceeded both the HOKEY WG
charter, as well as the RFC 3748 applicability statement. 

These nattering nabobs simply do not get it.  Requiring
WGs to stay within their charters is a barbaric practice
that limits creativity and encourages boredom and even
hooliganism.

Some of the architecturally minded IETF participants may
also note that by linking application layer security to
the link layer, the IETF is effectively adding EAP to
host requirements, since applications utilizing the
key hierarchy established in this document will not
be able to run on link layers that do not support EAP
(such as Fibre Channel).   In effect, the "waist" of
the Internet has now been moved down into its shoes,
which can, in some circumstances, make it difficult to
walk. 

Again, these ivory tower Archi-snobs do not get it. 
Do you know how expensive it is to deploy new networking
technologies or to develop a new product?  Do you know
how difficult it can be to pay for these things while
being hampered by your whiny notions of interoperability
and openness? 

Rather than "IP over everything", the new, improved
Walled Garden Internet is based on "Everything over EAP". 
Stop your endless whining and get used to it. 

CODA

As I noted earlier, by establishing EAP as a universal
application layer security mechanism for the Internet,
and by enabling vendors and SDOs to create their own
"usages" without IETF approval or even publication, 
this document establishes a Walled Garden 
standard for the Internet. 

Such a standard has been particularly assisted 
by the IETF's Security Area, which has within a 
short time taken an interoperable security 
mechanism developed for a narrow range of uses, 
and turned it into a supremely general, 
non-interoperable, non-backwards compatible 
solution to every Internet problem, real or 
imagined. 

To paraphrase Tilda Swinton's Oscar Acceptance Speech:

"To the IESG, you know, the seriousness and the 
dedication to your art... you rock, man!" 
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