RE: [Nea] UPDATED: WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

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> From: Marcus Leech [mailto:mleech@xxxxxxxxxx] 

> I think the problem that Keith is talking about is the 
> problem of "unreasonable" policies, which will instantly create
>   a "criminal" subculture in any networks that have such 
> "unreasonable" policies.   

The people talking about NEA are generally talking about securing corporate networks.


> For example, if the only ISPs that
>  are available to me insist that the machine I connect to 
> their precious network run Windows XP SP > foo, but I'm actually
>   a Linux user, then techniques will emerge that allow me to 
> fool the ISP into thinking that I'm a Windows XP SP > foo
>   machine.

And what if the cable company decides to only broadcast Fox News?

This is a political issue and not a technical one. This is not the purpose for which the specification is being proposed. The fact that some people might use it for that purpose is irrelevant. 

 
> Trying to enforce that a Turing-complete machine have 
> capabilities "no greater than X" might seem to an IT senior manager
>   to be a really good idea, but in practical terms, it can't 
> be done.  

Of course it can. 

Simply put a trustworthy computing partition on the machine. Palladium is more than capable of providing a proof that would be prohibitively expensive to defeat.
 

> And if you try to do this in any but the most tightly-purposed
>   networks, rebellion will be the inevitable result.

So you accept that the abuse scenario is not credible.


> Some companies have an emerging draconian policy about users 
> running only "authorized" software on their machines, with
>   a cumbersome "approvals" process for any new software that 
> someone might want to run on their machine. 

True, I expect this to become the default.


> Which includes
>   software written by the user themselves.  That type of 
> policy might be "reasonable" in a call-center, or some other
>   tightly-purposed network, but it fails in the general case, 
> and true enforcement is impossible.  This emerging draconian
>   policy is subtly re-defining that which constitutes "useful 
> work" in many places such that the only authorized things
>   you can do with your machine are to shuffle Word, 
> PowerPoint, and Excel documents around, surf the Web,
>   and e-mail  your co-workers.  

That is a matter for you to discuss with your employer. It is not something that a standards body should consider.




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