> > From: Keith Moore [mailto:moore@xxxxxxxxxx] > > > there is one important class of bad ideas that doesn't go > > away in IETF -- the class of bad ideas that is obviously bad > > from a wider perspective but which looks good to a set of > > people who are focused on a narrow problem. and in IETF what > > we often do with those ideas is to protect them and encourage > > development of them in isolation by giving them a working > > group. we sometimes even write those groups' charters in > > such a way as to discourage clue donation or discussion of > > other ways of solving the problem. > > That is a somewhat cynical way to describe IPSEC isn't it? Care to mention any other groups that fit that description? DKIM comes to mind, as does zeroconf. But I've seen so many examples of this over the years (including IPsec) that I've lost track. > The IESG and the IETF in general has hardly demonstrated an infalible understanding of what is and is not a bad idea, nor for that matter has anyone else. true. but the fact that we're not infallable doesn't mean we shouldn't try to improve things. > No Keith, you are not Vint Cerf, or Tim Berners-Lee and neither are the real Vint or Tim, respectively. (both smart guys whom I respect, but there's a difference between any real person and his reputation. and this isn't an discussion about personalities, it's a discussion about how to do protocol enginering) > I know that folk focused on narrow problems have tended to come up with narrow solutions. That is hardly suprising, the rules of engagement here prohibit the discussion of the general. which is my point - we need to change the rules of engagement. > Take DKIM for example we are about to discuss a one off policy language to serve a single protocol, not because there is only a single protocol that requires policy but because there are people in the establishment who tried policy fifteen years ago, failled to solve the problem and have declared it 'insoluble'. There is also the problem of the other group who need s to be part of the policy discussion which has repeatedly demonstrated itself to be unwilling to listen to any outside view. Try to explain a problem to them and its 'la la la I'm not listening'. DKIM as currently described in the I-Ds is a lot more broken than that, but they're not listening either. But it's a lot bigger problem than any single working group. I find DKIM a convenient example in this discussion because it's current, and because of my long history of working with email I have a keener interest in that WG than most. But it's not hard to find other examples. _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf