> >So in the question of ingress filtering what I am looking at is > >mechanisms to create accountability. > > Just beware that accountability in an interdependence system > can only based > on the threat of retaliation. What means that you must be a > little be more > equal than you peers for it to succeed. That is not true. Accountability must have consequences but 'retaliation' is a specific type of consequence that is generally considered to be best applied as a last resort. > Beware that whatever the accountability, when you are dead, > you are dead. > Your heirs can revenge you, but you failed your target. Accountability is used in the security field in a very specific fashion and with specific applications. Clearly you want to apply traditional access control approach to running a nuclear power station. But very few of the problems we are now concerned with fall into that category. This is to be expected, the problems for which access control is appropriate are essentially solved. The problems we have today are of the form where an individual violation is not that much of a concern but the aggregate violations are very much a concern. Spam is a prime example, one spam is a nuisance, a thousand a day makes email unusable. The other characteristic of the problems we are now facing is that the set of access criteria is not well defined. The question of what is spam is clear to the reader but very hard to define in machine readable terms. We thus have two basic tools; fuzzy logic type approaches to access control and accountability type schemes. Both are useful but in the long term the way to make the system stable is by establishing the right accountability mechanisms. _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf