Seems like a reasonable way to approach it.
a.
On 3 dec 2004, at 09.19, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:
In some other argument in some alternate universe, I said about the appeals issue:
I see three alternatives:
- Individual decisions of the IAOC cannot be appealed/reviewed by anyone
- We invent an entirely new process from scratch just for IAOC matters
- We funnel appeals against IAOC into the existing appeals process
I dislike the first and second choices (the first because it raises the
risk that one will have to resort to the recall "control"; the second
because inventing new process mechanism is *hard*), so by Hobson's
choice, I like the third.
A theory....
if "decisions of the IAOC can be appealed" rather reads:
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If someone believes that the IAOC has violated the IAOC rules and procedures, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG.
If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC BoT find that procedures are violated, they may advise the IAOC, but does not have authority to overturn or change a decision.
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I remember that 2026 rather carefully circumscribed the power of the appeals process - the IAB can nullify an IESG decision, but cannot make the IESG make a different one. In this case, I think that maybe the process should be even more circumscribed - if the decision is "hire an IAD", and the appeal is something like "you made the right choice, but did not file proper paperwork", nullifying the hire would make the situation for the newly hired IAD quite confusing.
Does this make some kind of sense?
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