Carl asks: > how about > <section title="Community Consensus and Grant of Authority"> > <t> > The IETF is a consensus-based group and authority to act on behalf > of the community is an act that requires a high degree of consensus > and the continued consent of the community > After a careful process of deliberation, there is a broad-based > community consensus to house the IETF Administrative & Support > Activities (IASA) within the Internet Society, which is reflected > in this Best Current Practice (BCP) RFC.</t> > <t> > Termination and change. Any change to this agreement shall require > a similar level of community consensus and deliberation and shall > be reflected by a subsequent Best Current Practice (BCP) RFC. > </t> > </section> I think that is fine but I don't think it addresses quite the issue I was talking about - Klensin's "Blowing the bolts" posting is closer to the issue - a number of people seem to want a principle that the AdminRest should structure the IASA and its accounts (such as a seperate bank account) in such a way to enable fast bolt blowing - I think that your 2nd pp is closer to mechanism than principle but I do not know how to formulate the principle (the logic in Klensin's posting aside). > > 2/ The IAD, IAOC and the ISOC shall not have any authority over the > > IETF > > standards development activities. > > > > That's almost true, but you probably need to address that the fact that > ISOC does play an important role in the standards process, a role > that is not changed by this document. note that what I'm trying to get at here is that the IAD, IAOC and the ISOC can not tell the IETF to adopt or not adopt a technology I thought about the point Carl raises and came to the conclusion that "no authority of the *standards development activities*" was accurate - the ISOC BoT does accept the process documents that have been developed using IETF processes but can not change such documents on its own, the boT also approves the IAB slate but that did not seem to me to be controling the standards development activities - the thing that comes closest in theory is that the ISOC BoT can act as the final step in an appeal that claims the standards process is flawed but in any such case I would expect the BoT (if the appeal were to be successful) would point out to the IETF what the problem was and leave it to the IETF to figure out how to fix it not change the process by itself in any case I think that the basic principle is that these groups have "no authority of the standards development activities" is a clean one to state - elsewhere in the document the details about approvals and appeals can be explained > > 7/ The right to use any intellectual property rights created by any > > IASA-related or IETF activity may not be withheld by the ISOC from the > > IETF. > > how about "withheld or limited in any way"? that is a better thing to say Scott _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf