[Last-Call] Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-18

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Viktor:

I understand, but it is in conflict with the MUST requirement for mutual certificate-based authentication.

Russ

> On Mar 9, 2025, at 12:39 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Mar 08, 2025 at 05:17:01PM -0800, Russ Housley via Datatracker wrote:
> 
>> Section 3.3: The text allows the use of [RFC7250] must be used in
>> the context of [RFC8446].  How is the requirement for certificates
>> accomplished with raw public keys?  I am unaware of any way to do so.
> 
> Well, FWIW, DANE-EE(3) TLSA records make it possible to validate the the
> raw public key of a peer.  So mutual TLS authentication is possible with
> RFC7250 raw public keys as the "certificate type".  But this is not well
> known, and might deserve a few sentences if intended to be supported in
> some cases.
> 
> The TLSA records associated with a server might be published in DNS
> (validated via DNSSEC), or might be a matter of local policy (static
> client-side configuration).
> 
> The TLSA records to authenticate a client's raw public key are much more
> likely to be static local policy on the server, but could in principle
> also be obtained from DNS if the client identity is DNS-based and this
> is supported by the server.
> 
> OpenSSL does support authentication of raw public keys (both server and
> client) via TLSA records.  It is up to the application to provide these,
> whether obtained from DNS, locally stored, or synthesised from some
> other form (e.g. stored copies of the expected public keys).
> 
> Postfix supports authentication of server RPKs, and use of client RPKs
> in ACLs based on lookup tables with the public key digest as a key.
> 
>    $ posttls-finger -c -Lsummary dnssec-stats.ant.isi.edu
>    posttls-finger: Verified TLS connection established
>        to dnssec-stats.ant.isi.edu[128.9.29.254]:25:
>        TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
>        key-exchange X25519MLKEM768
>        server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bit raw public key)
>        server-digest SHA256
> 
> -- 
>    Viktor.
> 
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