On Sun, Nov 03, 2024 at 12:49:47AM +0100, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
> Real mail security lies only in end-to-end methods involving the
> message bodies, such as those that use digital signatures (see
> RFC 1847 [26] and, e.g., Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) in RFC 4880
> [50] or Secure/ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
> in RFC 8551 [46])
I take issue with this statement. To me the mythical "ideal" of E2E
email encryption stands in the way of real incremental progress.
End-to-end encrypted email fails to meet fundamental usability
requirements, (long term retention and search) so much so that it is
essential no longer email. Only adequate for "instant messaging"
content, or similar ephemeral communication content.
Even if I had a GPG or S/MIME key you could find, and you sent me an
encrypted email I'd most likely delete it unread, and ask for an
unencrypted copy to be sent instead.
--
Viktor.
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