Reviewer: Yaron Sheffer Review result: Has Nits This document defines a way to explicitly share the multi-homing split horizon procedures over BGP, for a large variety of NVO use cases. This reviewer is not familiar with the EVPN ecosystem, and comments below may reflect my own ignorance. In general: the document is clear, and does not appear to create any novel security risks. 2.1: the first two paragraphs are duplicates. 2.2: "A received A-D per ES route where Single-Active and SHT bits are different from zero MUST be treat-as-withdraw" - IIUC, this is very fragile behavior, where an incorrect flag results in the entire path being removed. Why does this behavior make more sense than simply ignoring the SHT bits? 2.2: For the Geneve use case: is the value "10" always valid, or is it only valid if the ESI-Label is present? The text is unclear. 4: "The security considerations relevant to multihoming" - is it clear to all readers which security considerations these are? Are you referring to the entirety of Sec. 19 of RFC7432? 4: "unauthorized changes to the SHT configuration by an attacker should not cause traffic disruption" - when various kinds of misconfiguration are "treat as withdraw", how does that NOT cause traffic disruption? I would assume that when the route is withdrawn, eventually traffic is disrupted. 7: the Contributors section is empty. -- last-call mailing list -- last-call@xxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to last-call-leave@xxxxxxxx
