Reviewer: Christian Huitema Review result: Ready acceptable-urls-10-secdir-lc-huitema-2024-02-19/), I made a number of recommendations. One of the first recommendation was to clarify whether the distinction between "small changes" and "big changes" was really necessary, and maybe to just keep the stricter "big changes" process. The authors did not do that, probably based on their assessment of deployment considerations. However, they did address the substance of the issue in several ways. The draft now explicitly uses the same "small change/big change" terminology that I used in my review. That's a good way to clarify the issue. In the "small change" section, the draft now uses explicit references to the URL syntax in RFC3986, instead of the "righmost '/'" text that was encouraging "shotgun parsing". That's good. The previous "small change" process was vulnerable to "rollback" attacks, in which an attacker would reuse an old, more permissive, version of the MUD URL. The new draft version addresses that issue explicitly, asking MUD managers to keep track of previous versions so as to detect such rollback attacks. The authors assess that keeping such logs is practical, and I am ready to believe them. The previous security review pointed out that the use of "detached signatures" when evaluating "big changes" was somewhat unspecified. The introduction of section 4 now includes an explicit reference to Section 13.2 of RFC8520 where this problem is defined. I added to my previous comment a remark about the possibility to generate spurious intrusion alarms by sending spoofed messages through DHCP or LLDP. The authors pointed out that this such spoofed messages can only happen if the local network has been breached, and thus are valid alarms. There is already a related discussion in section 3.2, with references to the "boy cries wolf" issues. The new draft version feels significantly improved from the version that I reviewd, and I believe that my concerns have been addressed. -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
