Stephen,
Thank you very much for the comments.
Please see the resolution below.
Linda
-----Original Message-----
From: Stephen Farrell via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, February 2, 2024 8:03 AM
To: secdir@xxxxxxxx
Cc: bess@xxxxxxxx; draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage.all@xxxxxxxx; last-call@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-19
From: Stephen Farrell via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, February 2, 2024 8:03 AM
To: secdir@xxxxxxxx
Cc: bess@xxxxxxxx; draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage.all@xxxxxxxx; last-call@xxxxxxxx
Subject: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-19
Reviewer: Stephen Farrell
Review result: Has Issues
I looked at the diff from -15 to -19.
I think the main security issue of depending on BGP over TLS remains - that seems almost fictional (is it?), whereas the shepherd write-up says: "...this draft is simply describing the usage of existing technologies standardised within bess to SD-WAN."
I see Roman's existing discuss already covers this.
As this draft is aiming to become an informational RFC, I guess one could rewrite the sections mentioning TLS to say that BGP/TLS is needed for this to be secure, is not available today, but is something that is being developed (e.g. referring to draft-wirtgen-bgp-tls).
However, doing that before adoption of a work item for BGP/TLS by some routing WG might well be considered premature and overly optimistic?
[Linda] Thank you very much for the suggestion. This draft operates under the assumption that a secure channel exists between the SD-WAN controller and the SD-WAN edges. In the context of extending an VPN network to the SD-WAN scenario,
this secure channel can leverage the operator's primary management channel designed for VPN control. Consequently, there is no strict requirement for BGP over TLS. As a result, we can remove all references to TLS from the document.
In the "Security Considerations", is it beneficial to add a discussion of the security issue of using BGP over TLS?
Linda
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