Christian - On the surface, it would appear that particular argument (countermeasures have to be highly effective or else they simply encourage evolution and thus become ineffective over time) could be applied equally well to a large range of security measures – including many that are widely deployed today such as home and automobile locks, network intrusion monitoring, passwords on computer accounts, etc. Somehow we’ve determined that these measures remain useful, despite their imperfect nature and the continuous state of attack/defense evolution. Now one can argue that real world security analogies don’t apply, because in the real world there is often the prosecution of culprits – unlike occurs with those caught in spam filters – but I would note that there is rather significant prosecution efforts (and successes) today against CSAM production and distribution, so that comparison to spam detection really doesn’t hold up – even modestly functional measures that mitigate a small additional fraction of the activity would make a real very difference to those who don’t have to suffer the harms of trafficking & production. Perhaps I misunderstood, and there’s a more coherent formulation of why countermeasures are likely to "to increase the distribution and production of CSAM and with it the number of victims” – if so, can you elaborate? Thanks, /John p.s. disclaimers(s): my views alone. shock hazard – no user serviceable parts inside. |
