I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The summary of the review is Ready with nits. The Security Considerations look OK. I'm not that familiar with the corner of public key infrastructure covered in this draft. However, my understanding is that signing a strong hash of a digital object verifies the object to the extent that the signature can be verified regardless of how the object is obtained. So I found it curious that, in this case, if there is a filename associated with the hash in the signed checklist but the object was not from a file or from a file with a different name, then verification is required to fail. Nits/Trivia: ------------- In Section 5, Page 8, the possible disadvantage of so specially calling attention to Section 4.4.1 is that it implicitly reduces, even if only a small amount, the emphasis on the rest of Section 4. Possibly the following change which also has the advantage of being a bit shorter: OLD 1. The contents of the CMS eContent field MUST conform to the constraints described in Section 4. In particular, for each FileNameAndHash element in the checkList field, its contents MUST conform to the constraints described in Section 4.4.1. NEW 1. The contents of the CMS eContent field MUST conform to all of the constraints described in Section 4 including the constraints described in Section 4.4.1. Section 7, first sentence, Grammer: OLD When creating digital objects of a plain-text nature (such as ASCII, UTF-8, HTML, Javascript, XML, etc) it is RECOMMENDED to convert such objects into a lossless compressed form. NEW When creating digital objects of a plain-text nature (such as ASCII, UTF-8, HTML, Javascript, XML, etc) converting such objects into a lossless compressed form is RECOMMENDED. Section 8, Page 11 at beginning of last paragraph: "an one-time" -> "a one-time" I notice that the IANA "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.480.113549.1.9.16.1 )" registry entry for id-ct-signedChecklist references an old version of the draft. Presumably IANA will fix this as the document progresses. Thanks, Donald =============================== Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1-508-333-2270 (cell) 2386 Panoramic Circle, Apopka, FL 32703 USA d3e3e3@xxxxxxxxx -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call