On Mon, Aug 01, 2022 at 02:58:08PM -0600, Cullen Jennings wrote: > > > > On Jul 30, 2022, at 1:40 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > Hi again, > > > > The authors have conferred on this and at this time we don't think that we can recommend anything other than EC ciphers, for several reasons: > > > > 1. DHE negotiation is broken. > > Perhaps a bit more explanation in the draft about the issues with DHE-RSA (in context of 7919) would help. I was under the perhaps mistaken perception that the RFC 7919 was not subject to the Raccoon attack and that there were mitigation for the Racoon timing attacks. Given the reliance on a single class of algorithms, I think it would be worth highlighting the risks and provide good info on why alternatives don’t work. This was discussed in the TLS session at 114, as it happens; https://zulip.ietf.org/#narrow/stream/140-tls/topic/jabber/near/21527 has some links to previous mailing list discussions of the deployment issues that make RFC 7919 unusable in practice. > > > > > 2. Static RSA is out of the question. > > I agree but would prefer that was phrased as things don’t provide PFS are out of the question, not that RSA is not usable. I see lots of confusion of those two. I will note that, if EC was broken by quantum or optical computers but RSA was not, I’m pretty sure I would be switching to something with no PFS vs something that was broken. Yup. -Ben -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
