> On Nov 5, 2020, at 09:59, Yaron Sheffer via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Reviewer: Yaron Sheffer > Review result: Has Nits > > It's been a long time... > > My mail here [1] mentions two remaining open issues: a mention of QUIC and the > code point. > > The first (small) issue seems to have been forgotten. You are right, how about: OLD: The application layer protocol used to send the authenticator request SHOULD use TLS as its underlying transport to keep the request confidential NEW: The application layer protocol used to send the authenticator request SHOULD use a secure channel with equivalent security to TLS, such as QUIC [ID.draft-ietf-quic-tls], as its underlying transport to keep the request confidential I will also add an informative to QUIC via a PR. > I believe the second issue has been addressed by the WG, with the introduction > of a new message type. > > [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/n54wuiSwCx9VqgSrrWvX_9FCoW0/ I believe it does as well. spt -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
