Re: [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum-04

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Hello, Chris,

Thanks a lot for your comments! In-line....

On 9/9/20 20:16, Christopher Wood via Datatracker wrote:
Reviewer: Christopher Wood
Review result: Has Nits

Summary: Has Nits

Comments:

- Section 3: is it possible for an attacker to send DHCPv6 Prefix Delegations
with lifetime=0 to CE routers that support LAN-side DHCPv6 and amplify
Reconfigure messages to supporting clients? (I don't know if this is a concern
or part of the threat model, but this did seem to be a case of possible
request/response asymmetry.)

Not sure what you mean. PDs with a lifetime of 0 are orthogonal to Reconfigure messages.

If the client asked for reconfigure support, yes it will be accepting server reconfigure messages.

However, Reconfigure messages are required to be unicasted (RFC8415, Section 16.11), so there's no possibility for amplification (i.e., single server packet triggering actions on multiple clients).



- Section 4: rationale for these default values,
if available, might be worth including. (Why not make them shorter? What are
the tradeoffs?)

I suggested to add this in response to Dale's comments:

 "  However, while the aforementioned values represent an improvement
over the default values specified in [RFC4861], they represent a trade-off among a number of factors, including responsiveness, possible impact on the battery life of connected devices [RFC7772], etc. Thus, they may or may not provide sufficient mitigation to the problem discussed in this document.
"

?



- Section 6: it might be worth noting what happens if stable
storage is unavailable or otherwise compromised when trying to store prefix
information. What happens if the "A" or "L" bits are modified? (I suspect
nothing dangerous, but it's not clear to me whether or not integrity is
important.)

Compromised as in "an attacked intentionally caused different bits to be stored"?

If so, I'd say that's probably the least of your concerns. Since DHCPv6 exchanges are not encrypted or authenticated, your first concern would be forged packets. If the attacker has essentially hacked the CE Router, then all bets are off.



Nits:

- In some places "\"Valid Lifetime\"" is written as "valid-lifetime" -- should
these be made consistent?

We use "Valid Lifetime" for SLAAC PIOs, and "valid-lifetime" for DHCPv6 options, since that's what the respective specs use. Please do let us know if you think this should be clarified.

Thanks!

Regards,
--
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492




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