Reviewer: Valery Smyslov Review result: Ready I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The -24 version of this draft was reviewed by Adam Montville. I looked over his review and I think that the issue he raised about possible mitigation of DDoS amplification attacks has been addressed in this version. I personally think that sentences describing how DNS and NTP are vulnerable to amplification attacks are redundant in this document, but that's a matter of taste and doesn't hurt. It is my impression, that Security Considerations were mostly written having in mind that (D)TLS is always used, however it is only "SHOULD" in this draft (or even "MAY" if we look at RFC6690 which Security Considerations this draft refers to). I think that adding a few words describing which consequences for security not using (D)TLS would have and in which cases it is allowed will make the Security Considerations more consistent. -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
