Re: [Last-Call] [Cellar] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-cellar-ffv1-16

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Hi,

On 23/07/2020 19:50, Michael Richardson wrote:
Liang Xia via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
     > But about my one question, I have not seen any response or actions: "Issues for
     > clarification: In Security Considerations, besides the DoS attacks brought by
     > the malicious payloads, is there any other kinds of attack possibly? For
     > example, virus or worm are hidden in the malicious payloads to attack the
     > system for more damages? Does it make sense and what's the consideration?"

Hi, thank you for the review comments.
Aside from possible buffer-overflow attacks that would attempt to smash the
stack of a process, none of the content carried in ffv1 is intended to be executable.

A virus or worm hidden in the payload would be rendered as if it was visual
data by normal software processing.

Clearly, a malicious system could use the ffv1 format in an attempt to disquise
itself, but that would take a co-consipirator to extract that content.

I second Michael on the lack of attack implying hidden content, as the expected output is only visual content.

I added a pull request on the spec for adding an explicit mention of the lack of content intended to be executed at https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFV1/pull/224 , in addition to fixes of issues found during last call review at https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFV1/pull/223

Jérôme

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