Hi Frank, Thanks for the review. I agree that what's presented in the document is pretty straightforward and without direct security issues, however, I chose to try to broaden the scope of the document slightly, balloting Discuss to suggest adding a requirement that (when writing new protocols) the ACKs used as input for RTO algorithms be unspoofable from off-path (i.e., have enough entropy to be unguessable). That kind of scope expansion is probably outside the scope (pun intended) of a typical secdir review, though :) Thanks, Ben On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 05:54:56PM -0700, Liang Xia via Datatracker wrote: > Reviewer: Liang Xia > Review result: Ready > > This document is good written, and no new security issues as it's a network > mechanism requirements BCP document. > > > _______________________________________________ > secdir mailing list > secdir@xxxxxxxx > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir > wiki: http://tools.ietf.org/area/sec/trac/wiki/SecDirReview -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
