Re: [security] Race condition in udev

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On Tue, 25 Aug 2009 10:42:49 -0700
Greg KH <greg@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Tue, Aug 25, 2009 at 07:31:30PM +0200, Florian Zumbiehl wrote:
> > Assumption:
> > 
> >  /dev/foo is configured to be owned by user root, group users, mode
> > 0646. The attacker tries to open /dev/foo for writing as a user
> > that's not root, not a member of the group root, but a member of
> > the group users.
> > 
> > The Trace:
> > 
> >   action                     | owner | group | mode    |
> > open(O_WRONLY)?
> > ----------------------------+-------+-------+---------+-----------------
> > mknod(/dev/foo)            | root  | root  | 0644(?) | no
> > chmod(/dev/foo,0646)       | root  | root  | 0646    | yes
> > chown(/dev/foo,root,users) | root  | users | 0646    | no
> 
> Are there any current device nodes that get set to this kind of "odd"
> permissions with the current udev ruleset?


Even if there are, I still don't see how it's a bug in udev.

If you have a rule that configures a device with world-writable
permissions, why does it matter which group owns the device?

-RW

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