Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] setup: allow Git.pm to do unsafe repo checking

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On Mon, Oct 24, 2022 at 12:57:29PM +0200, Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason wrote:

> The important point/question I have is whether we can think of any such
> config variable understood by the code that uses Git.pm.

I don't think that matters. Before the CVE fix, Git.pm scripts were just
as vulnerable as all the other parts of Git. After, they were broken
because of the syntax error. Fixing the syntax error re-opened the bug
there, but as long as we close it again before releasing, we don't have
to care.

You can argue that the CVE wasn't that important for Git.pm, and thus
not that big a deal to re-open. But I think post-CVE we're making the
stronger promise that Git won't discover a repo directory with funky
ownership. And Git.pm is violating that (or would be after the syntax
fix if we don't go further).

> The only ones I can think are the "sendemail.{to,cc}Cmd" variables.

I don't think we can be that exhaustive. It's also any programs that are
called by scripts using Git.pm. But even that is not a closed set, since
we ship Git.pm for people to use in their own scripts. We don't know
what those scripts might be doing.

-Peff



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