Re: SHA-256 transition

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On 2022-06-21 at 10:25:01, Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason wrote:
> 
> But the reason I'd still say "no" on the technical/UX side is:
> 
>  * The inter-op between SHA-256 and SHA-1 repositories is still
>    nonexistent, except for a one-off import. I.e. we don't have any
>    graceful way to migrate an existing repository.

True, but that doesn't meant that new repositories couldn't use SHA-256.

>  * For new repositories I think you'll probably want to eventually push
>    it to one of the online git hosting providers, none of which (as far
>    as I'm aware) support SHA-256 repos.

This, in my view, is the only compelling reason not to use it for new
repositories.

>  * Even if not, any local git tooling that's not part of git.git is
>    likely to break, often for trivial reasons like expecting SHA-1 sized
>    hashes in the output, but if you start using it for your repositories
>    and use such tools you're very likely to be the first person to run
>    into bugs in those areas.

It's my hope to see libgit2 working on SHA-256 repositories in the
relatively near future.

> But more importantly (and note that these views are definitely *not*
> shared by some other project members, so take it with a grain of salt):
> There just isn't any compelling selling point to migrate to SHA-256 in
> the near or foreseeable future for a given individual user of git.

I wholly disagree.  SHA-1 is obsolete, and as soon as hosting providers
support SHA-256, all new repositories should be SHA-256.  There is no
other defensible reason to continue to use SHA-1 today.

> The reason we started the SHA-1 -> $newhash (it wasn't known that it
> would be SHA-256 at the time) was in response to https://shattered.io;
> Although it had been discussed before, e.g. the thread starting at [1]
> in 2012.
> 
> We've since migrated our default hash function from SHA-1 to SHA-1DC
> (except on vanilla OSX, see [2]). It's a variant SHA-1 that detects the
> SHAttered attack implemented by the same researchers. I'm not aware of a
> current viable SHA-1 collision against the variant of SHA-1 that we
> actually use these days.

That's true, but that still doesn't let you store the data.  There is
some data that you can't store in a SHA-1 repository, and SHA-1DC is
extremely slow.  Using SHA-256 can make things like indexing packs
substantially faster.
-- 
brian m. carlson (he/him or they/them)
Toronto, Ontario, CA

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