Re: [PATCH 2/2] hex: drop sha1_to_hex()

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On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 04:04:18AM -0500, Jeff King wrote:
> There's only a single caller left of sha1_to_hex(), since everybody now
> uses oid_to_hex() instead. This case is in the sha1dc wrapper, where we
> print a hex sha1 when we find a collision. This one will always be sha1,
> regardless of the current hash algorithm, so we can't use oid_to_hex()

Nit: s/oid_to_hex/hash_to_hex/

We can't use oid_to_hex() because we don't have a 'struct object_id'
in the first place, as sha1dc only ever deals with 20 unsigned chars.

> here. In practice we'd probably not be running sha1 at all if it isn't
> the current algorithm, but it's possible we might still occasionally
> need to compute a sha1 in a post-sha256 world.
> 
> Since sha1_to_hex() is just a wrapper for hash_to_hex_algop(), let's
> call that ourselves. There's value in getting rid of the sha1-specific
> wrapper to de-clutter the global namespace, and to make sure nobody uses
> it (and as with sha1_to_hex_r() in the previous patch, we'll drop the
> coccinelle transformations, too).


> diff --git a/sha1dc_git.c b/sha1dc_git.c
> index e0cc9d988c..5c300e812e 100644
> --- a/sha1dc_git.c
> +++ b/sha1dc_git.c
> @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ void git_SHA1DCFinal(unsigned char hash[20], SHA1_CTX *ctx)
>  	if (!SHA1DCFinal(hash, ctx))
>  		return;
>  	die("SHA-1 appears to be part of a collision attack: %s",
> -	    sha1_to_hex(hash));
> +	    hash_to_hex_algop(hash, &hash_algos[GIT_HASH_SHA1]));
>  }
>  
>  /*
> -- 
> 2.24.0.739.gb5632e4929



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