Jeff King <peff@xxxxxxxx> writes:
> Actually, there are only two callers left these days. One of them leaks,
> and the other immediately closes the zstream. So something like:
>
> diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c
> index 09ad64ce55..cea003d182 100644
> --- a/sha1_file.c
> +++ b/sha1_file.c
> @@ -978,10 +978,10 @@ static void *unpack_sha1_rest(git_zstream *stream, void *buffer, unsigned long s
> while (status == Z_OK)
> status = git_inflate(stream, Z_FINISH);
> }
> - if (status == Z_STREAM_END && !stream->avail_in) {
> - git_inflate_end(stream);
> + git_inflate_end(stream);
> +
> + if (status == Z_STREAM_END && !stream->avail_in)
> return buf;
> - }
>
> if (status < 0)
> error("corrupt loose object '%s'", sha1_to_hex(sha1));
> @@ -2107,7 +2107,6 @@ int read_loose_object(const char *path,
> *contents = unpack_sha1_rest(&stream, hdr, *size, expected_sha1);
> if (!*contents) {
> error("unable to unpack contents of %s", path);
> - git_inflate_end(&stream);
> goto out;
> }
> if (check_sha1_signature(expected_sha1, *contents,
>
> seems reasonable. Doing it that (with my other patch on top) splits the
> leak-fix and the not-yet-a-bug-but-confusing-error-return problems into
> two separate patches.
>
> I dunno. There aren't that many callers of unpack_sha1_rest(), so it may
> not matter that much, but while we're here...
Yeah, I agree that it is a reasonable thing to do.
