[PATCH] fixup! config: allow inaccessible configuration under $HOME

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A cleanup from Jeff King.

Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 wrapper.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Jeff King wrote:

> I kind of wonder if we are doing anything with the check at this point.
> I suppose ENOMEM and EIO are the only interesting things left at this
> point. The resulting code would be much nicer if the patch were just:
>
>   -access_or_die(...);
>   +access(...);
>
> but I guess those conditions are still worth checking for, especially if
> we think an attacker could trigger ENOMEM intentionally. To be honest, I
> am not sure how possible that is, but it is not that hard to do so.

Yeah, I was tempted to go the plain access() route.  The case that
convinced me not to is that I wouldn't want to think about whether
there could have been a blip in $HOME producing EIO when wondering how
some malformed object had been accepted.  The ENOMEM case just seemed
simpler to explain.

I would also be surprised if it is easy to control kernel ENOMEM
carefully enough to exploit (a more likely DoS outcome is crashing
programs or a kernel assertion failure, which are more harmless in
their way).  I've given up on predicting what is too hard or easy
enough for security folks.  I couldn't think of an obviously easier
vulnerability that is already accepted to put my mind at ease.

[...]
> I know you are trying to be flexible with the flag,

I was mostly worried about damage to readability if we end up needing
to go further down this direction.  The opportunity to look at all
call sites was also nice.

[...]
>   static int access_error_is_ok(int err, int flag)
>   {
>           return err == ENOENT || errno == ENOTDIR ||
>                   (flag & ACCESS_EACCES_OK && err == EACCES);
>   }

Nice.  Here's a patch for squashing in.

diff --git a/wrapper.c b/wrapper.c
index e860ad1..29a866b 100644
--- a/wrapper.c
+++ b/wrapper.c
@@ -408,11 +408,16 @@ void warn_on_inaccessible(const char *path)
 	warning(_("unable to access '%s': %s"), path, strerror(errno));
 }
 
+static int access_error_is_ok(int err, unsigned flag)
+{
+	return errno == ENOENT || errno == ENOTDIR ||
+		((flag & ACCESS_EACCES_OK) && errno == EACCES);
+}
+
 int access_or_warn(const char *path, int mode, unsigned flag)
 {
 	int ret = access(path, mode);
-	if (ret && errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR &&
-	    (!(flag & ACCESS_EACCES_OK) || errno != EACCES))
+	if (ret && !access_error_is_ok(errno, flag))
 		warn_on_inaccessible(path);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -420,8 +425,7 @@ int access_or_warn(const char *path, int mode, unsigned flag)
 int access_or_die(const char *path, int mode, unsigned flag)
 {
 	int ret = access(path, mode);
-	if (ret && errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR &&
-	    (!(flag & ACCESS_EACCES_OK) || errno != EACCES))
+	if (ret && !access_error_is_ok(errno, flag))
 		die_errno(_("unable to access '%s'"), path);
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
1.8.2.1

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